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Nesbitt: Trucking Deregulation and Florida's New Antitrust Act

TRUCKING DEREGULATION AND
THE FLORIDA ANTITRUST ACT OF 1980
INTRODUCTION

Regulation of transportation industries originated in Florida and on the
federal level in 1887.1 As the economy grew and developed, this early regulatory
scheme evolved into a comprehensive system, controlling industry entry, designated market areas and service levels, and setting permissible rates.2 Although
carriers and shippers alike were initially enthusiastic about regulation, 3 its
continued efficacy has recently been questioned.4 While some find regulation
necessary to prevent cutthroat competition and industry instability,5 opponents
claim that regulation has created an expensive and inefficient system of transporting people and goods by chilling competitive commercial activity. 6
The motor carrier industry was ignored in the Transportation Act of 1920,7
which regulated only rail carriers. s Left to operate unencumbered, the number
1. An act to regulate commerce, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). This act, now known as the
Interstate Commerce Act, applied "to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by
water." Section I of the Act specifically provided that the Act would not apply to transportation "wholly within one State." Four months after the Interstate Commerce Act was approved
on February 4, 1887, Florida passed the Act of June 7, 1887, 1887 Fla. Laws, ch. 3746. Both
the federal and Florida legislation is summarized by the lengthy title of the latter, "An Act
to Provide for the Regulation of Railroad Freight and Passenger Tariffs in this State, to
Prevent Unjust Discrimination in the Rates Charged for Transportation of Passengers and
Freights [sic] and to Prohibit Railroad Companies, Corporations and Lessees in this State
from Charging other than Just and Reasonable Rates, and to Punish the Same and Prescribe
a Mode of Procedure and Rules of Evidence in Relation thereto, and to Appoint Commissioners and to Prescribe their Powers and Duties in Relation to the same."
2. FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, FLORIDA's
REGULATION OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATION: A STUDY OF IsSUEs I (July 24, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as REGULATORY REFORM STUDY].
3. FLORIDA SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, A REVIEW OF CHAPTER 323, FLORIDA STATUTES (]
MOTOR CARRIERS AND FREIGHT FORwARDERS 6 (January 1980).
4. See, e.g., Anderson, Jerman, & Constantin, Railroad Versus Motor Carrier Viewpoints

on Regulatory Issues, 45 ICC PRAc. J. 294 (1978); Krutter, Judicial Enforcement of Competition in Regulated Industries, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1041 (1979); Steinfeld, Regulation Versus
Free Competition - The Current Battle Over Deregulation of Entry into the Motor Carrier
Industry, 45ICC PRAc. J. 590 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Farris, The Case Against Deregulation in Transportation, Power, and Communications, 45 ICC PRAc. J. 306 (1978); Ogborn, The Impact of Deregulation of the Trucking Industry, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Gellhorn, The Commission's Deregulatory Philosophy, 48 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
L.J. 541 (1979); Hewins, The Case for Unrestricted Entry into the Household-Goods Moving
Industry, 45 ICC PRAc. J. 453 (1978), A comprehensive list of the major arguments advanced
on each side of the trucking deregulation issue is contained in J. MirTR, THE PROS AND CONS
OF TRUCKING REGULATION (American Enterprise Institute Reprint No. 95, 1979), reprinted in
REGULATORY REFORM STUDY, supra note 2, at xv-xx.

7. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456.
8. Jacobs, Regulated Motor Carriersand the Antitrust Laws, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 90, 90-91
(1972).
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of trucks in commercial service increased from 86 thousand in 1914 to almost
3.5 million in 1930. 9 Because industry entry was unrestricted, a large number
of owner-operated, 10 undercapitalized trucking firms appeared. In this overcrowded market, ruthless competition created a high failure rate?'
In the absence of federal legislation, many states responded to this situation

by enacting statutes regulating motor carriers.1 2 While typically aimed at both
intrastate and interstate trucking,' 3 these statutes failed to provide a rational
and effective regulatory scheme.' By 1932, the inadequacy of state regulation

became apparent to Congress.'In an effort to stabilize the interstate trucking industry,'" Congress enacted
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.17 This Act, as amended by the Transportation
Act of 1940,18 vested the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) with the

authority to fully regulate all common
in interstate or foreign commerce.

9

and contract 20 motor carriers moving

The first sign of erosion in the federal regulatory framework occurred in
1978 when Congress deregulated the airline industry.21 In 1980, this erosion
the trucking industry; 22

culminated in the partial federal deregulation of

simultaneously, Florida completely deregulated trucking.23 Although truckers
9. Magnuson, The Motor CarrierAct of 1935: A Legislator Looks at the Law, 51 GEo.
L. Rv. 40 (1962).

WASH.

10. In 1934 only one percent of trucking firms owned more than two trucks. Id.
11. Id. at 40-41.
12. See, e.g., Act of June 15, 1931, 1931 Fla. Laws, ch. 14764.
13. The Florida act, however, was specifically not applicable to interstate commerce. Id.
§29.
14. Magnuson, supranote 9, at 41-42.
15. Id. at 43 &n.35.
16. Ogborn, supra note 5, at 2-3. In American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S.
298, 312 (1953), the Supreme Court noted that prior to the passage of the Motor Carrier Act
"the industry was unstable economically, dominated by ease of competitive entry and a fluid
rate structure. And as a result, it became overcrowded with small economic units which
proved unable to satisfy even the most minimal standards of safety or financial responsibility" (footnote omitted).
17. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543. This act added Part II to the Interstate Commerce Act.
18. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722,54 Stat. 898.
19. A common motor carrier was a motor carrier which undertook to transport passengers
or property for the general public in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation. Motor
Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, §203(a)(14), 49 Stat. 543.
20. A contract motor carrier was a motor carrier that, pursuant to individual contracts,
transported passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce. Id. §203(a)(15).
21. Although the air cargo industry was deregulated by the Act of Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278, regulation in the airline industry as a whole was relaxed by the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
22. Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 49 US.C.).
23. The Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (current version at FLA. STAT. §11.61 (1979))
automatically repeals those statutes which authorize the state to regulate various professions,
occupations, and industries. The intent of the legislature is "lt]hat the state shall not regulate
a profession, occupation, industry, business, or other endeavor in a manner which will un-
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gained new freedom to schedule routes and establish rates, they lost many of
the exemptions from antitrust liability they had enjoyed under regulation.
Shortly before trucking was deregulated, the Florida legislature enacted the
Florida Antitrust Act of 1980.24 Although this Act accords generally with federal statutory and case law, its prospective applicability to, and effect on,
recently deregulated industries is unclear. A key issue concerns the extent to
which anticompetitive conduct by trucking firms is exempt from antitrust
25

liability.

This note will attempt to identify those antitrust exemptions which remain
available to Florida truckers and their effect on Florida's trucking industry.
Federal and Florida antitrust regulation will be examined in light of the
purposes and policies underlying the regulation of trucking. After examining
the scope of available antitrust exemptions, this note will study those problems
which the recent legislative reforms may have inadvertently created. The confluence of partial federal and complete state trucking deregulation with federal
antitrust law and Florida's new, untested antitrust legislation has created, at
the very least, uncertainty. Finally, this note will conclude that antitrust laws
will fill the regulatory vacuum created by deregulation, largely by modifying
the scope of available antitrust exemptions.
TRUCKING REGULATION

Federal Trucking Regulation:
The Motor CarrierActs of 1935 and 1940
The federal Motor Carrier Act of 193526 and the Transportation Act of
regulated all interstate trucking, including common and contract motor

194027

reasonably adversely affect the competitive market." FLA. STAT. §11.61(2)(b) (1979). In furtherance of this intent, FLA. STAT. § 11.61(4) provides that the legislature shall consider the follow-

ing six criteria in determining whether to reestablish a program or function: (1) whether
absence of regulation would significantly harm or endanger the public health, safety, or welfare; (2) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the exercise of the police power
and the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare; (3) whether a less restrictive
method of regulation is available; (4) whether the regulation has the effect of directly or indirectly increasing the cost of the goods or services involved; (5) whether the increase in cost
is more harmful than the absence of regulation; (6) whether all facets of the regulatory
process have, as their sole purpose and primary effect, the protection of the public. Pursuant
to 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, §3(2)(h), FLA. STAT. ch. 323, relating to motor carriers and
freight forwarders, was repealed July 1, 1980, thereby effecting the complete deregulation of
intrastate trucking in Florida.
24. Fla. H.R. 701 (Reg. Sess. 1980, introduced by Rep. Moffitt) was passed by the Florida
House of Representatives on May 5, 1980, by a vote of 107 to 0. The next day it was passed
by the Florida Senate by a vote of 38 to 1. It was approved by the Governor on May 20, 1980
as the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, 1980 Fla. Laws, ch. 80-28. The Florida Antitrust Act,
which became effective on October 1, 1980, creates FLA. STAT. §§542.15-.32 and §§542.35-.36,
renumbers FiA. STAT. §542.12 and §542.13 as §542.33 and §542.34 respectively, and repeals
FLA. STAT. §§542.01-.11 (1979).
25. The Florida Antitrust Act, FLA. STAT. §542.20, provides that "[a]ny activity or conduct
exempt under Florida statutory or common law or exempt from the provisions of the antitrust
laws of the United States is exempt from the provisions of this chapter."
26. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543.
27. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898.
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carriers. 28 Exemptions were made for specific types of motor vehicles such as
taxicabs, farm trucks, and trollies.- Several sections of the Interstate Commerce
Act control activities which would be actionable under the antitrust laws.
Among these are prohibitions against the pooling or division of traffic without
ICC approval3 0 and controls on consolidations, mergers, and the acquisition of
control of a carrier. 81 Antitrust immunity is provided to carriers participating
in ICC-approved transactions.3 2
The antitrust immunity conferred by the 1935 and 1940 Acts is illustrated
by McLean Trucking Co. v. United States.a3 In McLean, the plaintiff motor
carrier filed suit to set aside an ICC order authorizing the consolidation of
several of its competitors.3 4 In approving the consolidation,3 5 which created the
nation's largest motor carriers6 the ICC had announced its intention to encourage consolidations in the trucking industry. This policy would conform
trucking regulation to the railroad industry, a model with which the ICC had
7
decades of experience.8
The United States Supreme Court construed plaintiff's argument as an
allegation that the merger violated the Sherman Act and that the ICC was
therefore powerless to approve it. 8 Although the Court was aware that the
historical considerations which guided administrative authorization of railroad
28. See notes 19 and 20 supra.
29. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498 §203(b), 49 Stat. 543 (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§10526(a) (1976)).
30. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, §7, 54 Stat. 898 (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§11342(a) (1976)). The current version provides that the ICC may approve an agreement to
pool or divide traffic if it will be in the public interest and it will not unreasonably restrain
competition.
31. Id. (current version at 49 U.S.C. §11343 (1976)). The current version provides that
mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions of control may be effected only with the approval
and authorization of the ICC, except that no such approval is required if the only parties to
the transaction are motor carriers already subject to ICC jurisdiction and the aggregate gross
operating revenues of the carriers are not more than $300,000 annually.
32. 49 U.S.C. §11341(a) (1976) provides that "[t]he authority of the Interstate Commerce
Commission under this subchapter is exclusive ....

A carrier, corporation, or person par-

ticipating in [a transaction approved by the ICC] is exempt from the antitrust laws and from
all other law, including State and municipal law, as necessary to let that person carry out the
transaction, hold, maintain, and operate property, and exercise control or franchises acquired
through the transaction."
33. 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
34. Id. at 69. In the original litigation, Associated Transport, Inc., applied to the ICC to
obtain control of eight motor carriers. Although the application was opposed by the Secretary
of Agriculture, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the National Grange,
four associations of fruit growers, and a motor carrier, the application was approved. McLean
Trucking, a competitor of some of the carriers involved in the merger, then brought suit to
have the ICC's order approving the application set aside. After the suit was begun the ICC
modified its order to exclude one of the eight motor carriers. Id. at 68-70.
35. Associated Transport, Inc.-Control & Consolidation -Arrow Carrier Corp., 38
M.C.C. 137 (1942).
36. 321 U.S. at 70.
37. Associated Transport, Inc.-Control & Consolidation -Arrow Carrier Corp., 38
M.C.C. at 162-63.
38. 321 U.S. at 77.
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mergers differed from those relevant to motor carrier mergers,39 it chose to
ignore this distinction. The Court found competition among carriers to be of
value primarily as it aids the achievement of national transportation policy
objectives.40 Although noting that Congress had anticipated the anticompetitive
effects of motor carrier consolidation, 4 1 the Court assumed a noninterventionist
stance in concluding that the ICC, through its knowledge and expertise, was
best equipped to assess the commercial impact of the merger on industry competition.42
Motor carriers quickly realized the value of the Court's pro-consolidation
stance. After the McLean decision, the ICC approved a previously denied application for the consolidation of 325 household goods movers. 43 The Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice had previously filed a Sherman Act complaint and obtained a consent decree prohibiting most of the carriers from
entering into any combination with each other. 44 Nevertheless the ICC cited
McLean for the proposition that, if the consolidation were approved, section
5(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act 45 would immunize the consolidating
parties from antitrust liability. 46 Thus, the tension between comprehensive
regulation and robust competition was resolved in favor of regulation.
Many of the strict regulatory policies of the 1935 and 1940 Acts were relaxed
by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. 4 7 This Act, which has as its stated purpose
the reduction of unnecessary federal regulation,48 amends the national trans39. Id. at 85 n.22. The Court had earlier noted that the reason for exempting rail consolidations from antitrust restrictions was "in order to rehabilitate a broken down industry,"
a consideration which did not apply to motor carriers. Id. at 78. The impetus behind the
original movement to regulate the railroads derived from predatory business practices which
the railroads were able to engage in because of the lack of competition, while precisely the

opposite situation, cutthroat competition, applied to the trucking industry. See note 33 and
text accompanying notes 106-14 supra.
40. Id. at 85-86 (footnote omitted). The national transportation policy in effect at the
time is found in the Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, §1, 54 Stat. 898 (current version at

49 U.S.C. §10101(a) (1976)). The policy acknowledges that three of the goals of regulation of
transportation are: the promotion of "safe, adequate, economical, and efficient transportation;"
the encouragement of "sound economic conditions in transportation;" and the encouragement

of "the establishment and maintenance of reasonable rates for transportation without unreasonable discrimination or unfair or destructive competitive practices." 49 U.S.C. §10101(a)
(1976).
41. 432 U.S. at 86 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 87.
43. Allied Van Lines, Inc. - Purchase - Evanston Fireproof Warehouse, 40 M.C.C. 557,
607-08 (1946). In the earlier case, Allied Van Lines, Inc.- Pooling, 39 M.C.C. 287 (1943), a
group of 362 household goods movers had applied to the ICC pursuant to §5(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act (current version at 49 U.S.C. §11342 (1976)) for authority to pool their
ibusinesses and appoint Allied Van Lines as their agent. The ICC, finding the record unpersuasive that the proposal would be consistent with the public interest, denied the application. Id. at 309.

44.
585-86.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Allied Van Lines, Inc. - Purchase - Evanston Fireproof Warehouse, 40 M.C.C. at
Current version at 49 U.S.C. § 11343 (1976).
Allied Van Lines, Inc. - Purchase - Evanston Fireproof Warehouse, 40 M.C.C. at 587.
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.
Id. §2 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §10101).
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portation policy to include the promotion of competitive and efficient transportation services. 49 One of the Act's most important provisions increases opportunities for new carriers to enter the industry, and for established carriers to
expand their routes, by modifying the traditional public convenience and
necessity test. 50 Formerly, the applicant bore the burden of establishing that
its proposed service met rigorous standards of public convenience and necessity.
Under the revised test, the ICC must grant an operating certificate if the applicant can show its fitness, willingness, and ability to provide a useful public
service.6 1 Furthermore, the opponent of the application must show that the
proposed service is inconsistent with the public convenience.2
Of significance from the standpoint of antitrust liability is section 19, which
reflects congressional concern that individual state requirements imposed upon
interstate motor carriers are "confusing, lacking in uniformity, unnecessarily
duplicative, and burdensome." 3 This section directs certain state officials and
agencies to develop recommendations directed toward providing a more efficient system of state regulations for interstate motor carriers by December 31,
1981.1'
FloridaTrucking Regulation:1929-1980
Florida began to regulate trucking in 1929, when the legislature enacted the
state's first trucking regulation statute.P5 After this statute was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, 6 the 1931 session of the Florida
legislature enacted a new motor carrier regulation scheme.67 The 1931 statute,
which remained in force for almost half a century, required that motor carriers
obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.5 Court decisions
have consistently emphasized that the certificate requirement is designed to
avoid congestion of the highways and to insulate motor carriers from excessive
competition.89
49. Id. §4 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §10101).
50. Id. §5(a) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §10922).

51. Id. While the Act itself retains the phrase "public convenience and necessity" as a
condition to ICC certification, the House Report indicates unequivocally that Congress intended to modify this former restrictive certification standard. H.R. REP. No. 96-1069, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4109, 4111.

52. Id. In addition, application protests are limited and the test is eliminated altogether
for carriers of certain specified commodities. Id.
Other sections of the 1980 act provide for the future elimination of regulations which
prevent carriers from travelling by the most direct routes and from making intermediate
stops, id. §6 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §10922); provide pricing reform by giving carriers
greater feedom to set rates in response to market fluctuations, id. §11 (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. §10708); and address matters such as service to small communities, id. §28, intermodal
transportation, id. §34, and regulatory lag, id. §25 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. §10322).
53. Id. §19.
54.

Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Act of July 1, 1929, 1929 Fla. Laws, ch. 13700.
Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
Act of June 15, 1931, 1931 Fla. Laws, ch. 14764.
Id. §2.

59. See, e.g., Central Truck Lines v. Railroad Comm'n, 146 Fla. 521, 1 So. 2d 470 (1941).
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Until recently, intrastate motor carriers in Florida were regulated by the
Florida Public Service Commission.60 The full burden of regulation fell upon
common carriers,61 who were subject to regulation of entry, 62 rates,6 3 safety,64
bonding, and insurance,65 and were required to pay a road tax.6

Other types

of carriers were subject to less stringent regulation7 while others were subject

to no regulation at

all.

68

This comprehensive regulatory scheme was abandoned for complete deregulation in 1980.69 It would appear, therefore, that the recommendations
produced by section 19 of the Motor Carrier Act of 198076 will not apply to

Florida insofar as the Florida act applies only to intra-Florida trucking. However, the Florida act is non-uniform in that, unlike other states, it imposes no

additional requirements on interstate truckers operating within the state. 71
The question then arises whether Congress could, pursuant to the recommendations proposed under section 19, mandate a certain base level of state trucking

regulation. While Congress arguably possesses the power to impose such a requirement,72 a more feasible alternative would be the requirement that state

regulation of trucking not exceed some minimal level. Although forced partial
state deregulation of the trucking industry would be vehemently opposed by
industry trade groups, 7 3 it would comport with the federal deregulatory trend.
60. FLA. STAT. §323.07 (1979) (repealed 1980).
61. A common carrier was defined as "any person engaged in motor carrier transportation
of persons or property for compensation over the public highways of this state who holds his
service out to the public and provides transportation over regular or irregular routes." Id.
§323.01(19) (repealed 1980).
62. Id. §323.03 (repealed 1980).
63. Id. §323.08 (repealed 1980).
64. Id. §323.13 (repealed 1980).
65. Id. §323.06 (repealed 1980).
66. Id. §323.15 (repealed 1980).
67. These carriers were divided into four types: (1) Contract carriers: those who transport persons or property under contract for one or more shippers on a continuing basis (subject to full regulation; however, barriers to entry were somewhat lower); (2) Carriers exempt
from rate regulation: road building and construction aggregate haulers, armored cars,
charter busses, and carriers transporting newspapers; (3) Permit carriers: carriers under contract to the federal government, livestock, seafood, and agricultural carriers, transportation
incidental to primary business of maintenance, and transportation of houses (permit issued
as a matter of right; no rate regulation); (4) Registered interstate carriers (certificate of
registration granted automatically; subject to safety and insurance requirements and, in some
cases, the road tax).
68. FLA. STAT. §323.29 (1979) (repealed 1980) listed eleven types of motor vehicles which
were completely exempt from Public Service Commission registration. Examples are schoolbusses, certain agricultural and horticultural carriers, hearses, and wreckers.
69. See note 23 and accompanying text, supra.
70. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
71. See note 23 and accompanying text, supra.
72. Under the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3, Congress has been granted
broad powers to regulate matters which affect interstate commerce.
73. A recent newspaper article notes that Florida truckers "lobbied furiously" to oppose
deregulation. State Limits on Trucking End; U.S. Eases Controls, Gainesville Sun, July 2,
1980, §A, at 1, col. 1. Another article points out that some local truckers "are steaming mad"
about deregulation. Moving Firms Fuming Over Deregulation, id., col. 2.
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As the leader in state deregulation, Florida will be closely watched by both
74
lawmakers and trade groups.
The simplification of the regulatory scheme in Florida gives rise to a complex set of legal problems. After a summary of the development of relevant
antitrust exemptions, these problems will be considered in light of the Florida
Antitrust Act of 1980. Of key importance is the scope of antitrust exemptions
which remain available to the Florida trucking industry.
FLORIDA AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST AcTs

Before the first Florida antitrust act 75 was passed in 1915, courts relied on
common law principles to censure anticompetitive behavior. At common law,
however, anticompetitive agreements were unenforceable but not unlawful.7 6
Therefore, the first Florida antitrust act was passed in an effort to render anticompetitive conduct unlawful and thus punishable.77 In an early case,78 however, the Florida supreme court reverted to common law principles. The court
found a pooling arrangement in violation of the act,7 9 but it refused to assess
any penalty and dismissed the complaint.80 In another early case,"' a cooperative marketing contract was challenged as being in restraint of trade.8 2 The
court upheld the contract, employing a rule of reason analysis8 3 to determine
that the contract did not unreasonably restrain trade8 4 This rule of reason approach has been followed by Florida courts until the present time, despite the
case of United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.s5 in which the United States
Supreme Court declared uniform price-fixing a per se violation of the Sherman
Act regardless of the reasonableness of the prices st As a result of such restrictive
interpretation, the 1915 act did little to advance Florida antitrust law beyond
87
common law limitations.
74. The ICC has allotted $200,000 to study the effects of Florida's experiment in deregulation. State Limits on Trucking End; U.S. Eases Controls, supra note 73, §A, at 1, col. 1.
75. Act of June 4, 1915, 1915 Fla. Laws, ch. 6933.
76. Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 676-77, 154 So. 690, 693 (1934).
77. Act of June 4, 1915, 1915 Fla. Laws, ch. 6933. The title of this legislation, "An Act to
Define Trusts, Provide for Penalties and Punishment of Corporations, Persons, Firms and
Associations of Persons Connected With Them, and to Promote Free Competition in the
State of Florida," summarizes its purposes. The act provided for a fine of $50 to $5,000, or
imprisonment for one to ten years, or both. Id. §5(5). In addition, the act authorized a fine
of $50 for each day of violation. Id. §9.
78. Ricou v. Crosland, 81 Fla. 574, 88 So. 380 (1921).
79. Id. at 579, 88 So. at 381.
80.
81.

Id.
Lee v. Clearwater Growers Ass'n, 98 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722 (1927).

82. Id. at 219, 111 So. at 728. Curiously, the contract was challenged under the Constitution rather than the Florida antitrust act or the Sherman Act.
83. The "rule of reason" imposes antitrust liability only if the conduct complained of
unreasonably restrains trade. See note 90 infra.
84. Lee v. Clearwater Growers Ass'n, 93 Fla. at 214,219, 111 So. at 728.
85. 278 U.S. 392 (1927).
86. Id. at 398.
87. See, e.g., Hardrives Co. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 166 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla. 2d

D.C.A. 1964).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss5/8

8

Nesbitt: Trucking Deregulation and Florida's New Antitrust Act
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

Both before and after the 1915 Florida act, several other states attempted
to prohibit monopolies and similar competition-restricting devices via constitutional8s or statutory 9 provisions. The states, however, lacked authority to
regulate corporations engaged in interstate commerce.Y0 Realizing that effective
regulation could be achieved only at the federal level,91 Congress passed the
88. One authority lists 14 states with pre-Sherman Act constitutional anticompetition
provisions: Arkansas, 1874; Connecticut, 1818; Georgia, 1877; Idaho, 1889; Kentucky, 1850;
Maryland, 1865; Massachusetts, 1780; Montana, 1899 (correct date is 1889); North Carolina,
1776 and 1868; North Dakota, 1889; Tennessee, 1870; Texas, 1845 and 1876; Washington,
1889; Wyoming, 1889 (the Wyoming constitution was ratified in 1889 but did not become
effective until statehood was granted on July 10, 1890, eight days after passage of the Sherman
Act). M. Fop.KoscH, ANTrrRUST AND THE CONSUMER 412-16 (1956). Another authority lists
Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. H. THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 155 n.194 (1955). However, the historical note to the South
Dakota anti-monopoly provision, S.D. CONST. art. XVII, §20, states that "[t]he 1895 proposal,
adopted in 1896, added this section to the Constitution." 1 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 515 (1978
Rev.).
89. Iowa, 1888; Kansas, 1887; Kentucky, 1890; Maine, 1889; Michigan, 1889; Mississippi,
1890; Missouri, 1889; Nebraska, 1889; North Dakota, 1890; South Dakota, 1890; Tennessee,
1889; Texas, 1889. M. FORKOSCH, supra note 30, at 417-27. Thorelli lists Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. H. TORELLi, supra note 30, at 155 n.195. In reviewing the
history of the North Carolina antitrust law, the supreme court of that state noted that the
first such provision was enacted well after the passage of the Sherman Act. Shute v. Shute, 176
N.C. 462, 465, 97 S.E. 392, 893 (1918).
90. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 221,
246 (1956); 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 180 (1980).

91. Letwin, supra note 90, at 246-47; 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 90, at 130.
Although the Interstate Commerce Act was enacted in 1887 to meet the need created by
gross anticompetitive business practices that arose after the Civil War, prohibitions against
restraints on trade date back to the earliest days of the common law. Ancient Anglo-Saxon
custom, later included in the laws of the Norman kings, sought to eliminate the middleman
in order to facilitate trade. I E. KirrNE, supra note 90, at 41. Common law prohibitions
against forestalling and engrossing, which were codified as early as the mid-sixteenth century
in 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c.14 (1552) (3 Statutes at Large 588 (1911)), were eventually made the basis
for §2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolizing. Letwin, The English Common Law
Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. RFv. 355, 384 (1954). Nevertheless, monopolistic practices flourished at early common law and no serious pressure was brought to bear on them
until the growth of the industrial revolution. Jones, HistoricalDevelopment of the Law of
Business Competition (pt. 1), 35 YALE L.J. 905, 937-38 (1926).
In the period following the Civil War, Americans witnessed unprecedented economic
growth. The expansion of the railroads and the accelerated industrialization of the northeastern United States caused fabulous wealth to be concentrated in the hands of a few
captains of industry. Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Anti-Trust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. Rzv.
215, 232 (1953). Unscrupulous business practices gradually eliminated both competition and
competitors from the market. Id. at 230-42. Finally, reaction against the railroads by the
Granger movement and by farmers who were charged discriminatory shipping rates emphasized the need for federal regulation of the railroads. Note, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The Problems With Putting New Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CORP. L. 547,
551-52 (1979).
The Interstate Commerce Act was enacted in 1887 to meet this need. It provided that all
charges should be just and reasonable, prohibited rate discrimination, required that charges

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 5 [1980], Art. 8

1980]

FLORIDA'S NEW ANTITRUST

ACT

Sherman Act on July 2, 1890.92 In its present form,93 section 1 declares illegal
all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade.94 Section 2 prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize any part of trade or commerce.9 5 These two provisions, which survive in very nearly their original
form, 96 are sufficiently broad to include virtually every type of anticompetitive
9
behavior. r
for short hauls not be greater than charges for long hauls, prohibited pooling arrangements,
required the posting of rate charges, and created the Interstate Commerce Commission. By its
own terms, however, the Act was restricted to transportation service performed wholly or
partly by railroad. See note I supra.
92. An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, ch.
647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). The legislative history of the Sherman Act is thoroughly explored in
1 E.KiNTNER, supra note 90, at 125-242 and 1 E. KrNTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTrrUsr LAwS AND RELATED STATUTES 7-363 (1978). Shorter treatments may be
found in Letwin, supra note 90, and Limbaugh, supra note 91.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1976).
94. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." 15 U.S.C. §1

(1976).
95. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation,
or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." 15 U.S.C. §2 (1976).
96. Amendments to the original Sherman Act have been minor. The Act of July 7, 1955,
ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282, increased the maximum fines for violations of §§1, 2, or 3 from $5,000
to $50,000. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, §3, 88 Stat.
1708, made violations of the Sherman Act a felony and established the present penalties. See
notes 94 & 95 supra. A statutory exemption for resale price maintenance agreements by trademark owners, where permitted under state fair-trade laws, was added by the Miller-Tydings
Act of 1937, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 693, and repealed by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801. Jurisdiction was changed from the United States
circuit courts to the federal district courts by the Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §291, 36 Stat.
1167. The title "district attorneys of the United States" in §4 was changed to read "United
States Attorneys" by the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §501, 62 Stat. 909. The original §7 of the
Sherman Act, which authorized private treble-damage actions, was repealed by the Act of July
7, 1955, ch. 283, §3, 69 Stat. 283. An identical provision is contained in §4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §15 (1976), so this repeal had no substantive effect. The original §8 of the Sherman
Act is now codified at 15 U.S.C. §7 (1976).
97. Legislation which amended the Sherman Act is listed in note 96 supra. The balance
of the federal antitrust legislation was principally provided by four acts. The first of these,
,the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §41
et seq. (1976)), was enacted in the wake of the Supreme Court's announcement of the "rule of
reason" in StandardOil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). This decision, which declared
that only activity which unreasonably restrains trade would be subject to Sherman Act liability, introduced uncertainty as to which trade practices were illegal and which were not. To
remedy this uncertainty, the act established a permanent administrative agency, the Federal
Trade Commission, to supervise enforcement of the antitrust laws.
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ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS

The regulation of the trucking industry necessitated adjustments in the
application of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, truckers were exempted from
antitrust liability in some instances of anticompetitive conduct. An examination
of these exemptions under regulation is useful in analyzing the extent to which
the antitrust laws have filled the vacuum left by the deregulation of motor
carriers.
Exemption by LegislativeAction
A 1945 Georgia case precipitated major legislative action to exempt trucking
from antitrust liability. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.28 the state of
Georgia alleged that several railroads had combined to form rate bureaus that
established discriminatory rates in violation of the Sherman Act.9 9 After stating
flatly that the carriers were subject to the antitrust laws, 1°° the Court observed
that Congress had not authorized the ICC to exempt rate-fixing combinations
from the reach of the antitrust laws,"' and held that Georgia had properly
alleged a cause of action under the Sherman Act. 02 In response, Congress passed
the Reed-Bulwinkle Act in 1948.103 This act legalized carrier rate associations
formed for the purpose of collective ratemaking and exempted them from the
antitrust laws, provided the associations were approved by the ICC.104
Over the years an extensive system of rate bureaus developed to take advantage of Reed-Bulwinkle's antitrust immunity. 105 Rate bureau activities include processing general carrier rate increases, processing single-line and jointline rate proposals, 0 6 and publishing tariffs. 10 7 The major advantage of the

rate bureau system is the predictability it brings to the rate structure. It is
The Clayton Act, ch. 321, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 29

U.S.C.), was enacted to fill several gaps in the antitrust laws. The two major provisions prohibited price discrimination (§2) and certain corporate mergers which would have the effect
of substantially lessening competition (§7). The Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526
(1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§13-13b, 21a (1976)), rewrote the price discrimination provisions
of §2 of the Clayton Act. Finally, the antimerger provisions of §7 of the Clayton Act were

made more restrictive by the Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§18, 21 (1976)).
98. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
99. Id. at 443-44.
100. Id. at456.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 462.
103. Reed-Bulvinkle Act, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §10706 (1976)).
104. If the rate bureau agreement is approved by the Commission, "the antitrust laws ...
do not apply to parties and other persons with respect to making or carrying out the agreement." 49 U.S.C. §10706(b) (1976).
105. H.R. REP. No. 96-1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4109, 4135.
106. A single-line rate is a rate offered by a motor carrier of property that applies
throughout its route structure and does not involve the services of any other carrier. A jointline rate, however, does involve the services of other carriers.
107. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 105, at 4135.
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also a system with which shippers and truckers are familiar. The system's major
disadvantage is its tendency to generate rate schedules that adequately compensate even the least efficient participating carrier, thus minimizing price competition. 08 On the other hand, the publication of tariffs facilitates wide dissemination of rate information, a service of great public value.
When the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation debated
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, the most controversial issue was whether the

Reed-Bulwinkle Act should continue in force.110 In its final form, the Act
eliminated antitrust immunity for discussion or voting on single-line rates
effective January 1, 1984.-10 This provision, which is a compromise between
predictability and efficiency, will effectively require individual carriers to independently determine their own cost structures and optimum rates. The
result will be an increase in price competition and, hopefully, a corresponding
improvement in industry service and efficiency.",
Exemption by JudicialAction

The Sherman Act, in both its original and present forms, contains no exemptions or exceptions." 2 In an early case, 3 the Supreme Court refused to find
an exemption in the absence of a specific statutory provision.114 Subsequently,
courts came to recognize that, where the state affirmatively commands certain
economic activity, the affected industry should be exempt from liability for
resulting antitrust violations-"; Accordingly, the judge-made state action doctrine was developed as a recognition of the integrity of state sovereignty."8
Although an early decision 17 established that the Sherman Act, by its terms,
is inapplicable to the states," l8 the modern state action doctrine appeared in
108.
109.
110.
111.
codified

Id.
See note 105 supra.
U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWs, supra note 105, at 4136.
Id. at 4137. Prohibition of collective ratemaking under zone of rate freedom is to be
at 49 U.S.C. §10708(d); rates for limited liability are to be codified at 49 U.S.C.

§10780(b).
112. An exemption for resale price maintenance agreements was added in 1937, but was
repealed in 1975. See note 96 supra.
113. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 296 (1897).
114. Noting that it was "asked to hold that the [Sherman Act] . .. excepts contracts which
are not in unreasonable restraint of trade, and which only keep rates up to a reasonable price,
notwithstanding the language of the act makes no such exception," id. at 340, the Court refused to "interpolate an exception into the language of the act, and to thus materially alter its
meaning and effect." Id.
115. See text accompanying notes 119-126 infra. The state action doctrine derived from
antitrust law should be distinguished from the state action doctrine which courts apply to
determine whether the protections of the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution are applicable. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
116. Rogers, The State Action Antitrust Immunity, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 147, 151 (1978).

117. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
118. The fledgling state action doctrine was expanded and clarified in Olsen v. Smith, 195
U.S. 332 (1904), in which a group of licensed harbor pilots sought to enjoin unlicensed pilots
from plying their trade without first obtaining a state license. The unlicensed pilots challenged the constitutionality of the Texas statute, arguing, inter alia, that the statute restricted
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1943 when Parkerv. Brown119 was decided. In Parker,a raisin producer asserted
that a California agricultural protection law 120 designed to support farm prices
violated the Sherman Act. 21 In rejecting this argument, the United States
Supreme Court relied both on statutory history and language, and on considerations of federalism. Although willing to assume that the California scheme
would violate the Sherman Act if it was accomplished solely by a combination
or conspiracy of private individuals or corporations, 23 the Court found "no
hint" 124 in either the Sherman Act or its legislative history that the Act was
intended to restrain state action.1 25 Also concerned about implications of federalism, the Court concluded that California imposed the restraint of trade as
an act of government, which was therefore not prohibited by the Sherman
6
Act."2
As a complement to the state action doctrine, courts have held immune
from antitrust liability competitors who join together in an attempt to persuade
legislative or administrative bodies to enact a law or take action which would
otherwise be anticompetitive in nature. This principle, known as the Noerrcompetition and conferred a monopoly on the licensed pilots in violation of the federal antitrust laws. In upholding the statute against the antitrust attack, the Supreme Court found
that Texas had the plenary power to regulate the trade of harbor pilotage in the absence of
Congressional preemption and noted that no monopoly can arise merely because individuals
comply with anticompetitive mandates of the state.
The decision in Olsen must be considered in light of a restriction announced in Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). Defendants, charged with forming an
unlawful merger which violated the Sherman Act prohibition of combinations in restraint of
trade, argued that they were immune from prosecution because the merger had been effected
through the formation of a holding company which New Jersey had allowed to be incorporated. The Supreme Court noted in passing that there were no indications that New Jersey
intended, by approval of the firm's incorporation, to condone an anticompetitive combination.
But nevertheless it concluded that federal law will preempt state law which purports to
authorize unsupervised private action which is violative of the antitrust laws.
A distinction must be made between state laws which merely authorize anticompetitive
practices and those which compel such behavior. It has been noted that federal law preempts
the former but not the latter. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 61 (1978).
119. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
120. The California Agricultural Prorate Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stats.
1969 (current version at CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§59501-60015 (West)). The California Supreme
Court had previously sustained the constitutionality of the act under both the federal and
California constitutions in Agricultural Prorate Comm'n v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 2d 550, 55
P.2d 495 (1936).
121. 317 U.S. at 348-49. The plaintiff also alleged violations of the Federal Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and the commerce clause of the Constitution. Id.
123. Id. at 350.
124. Id. at 351. However, the Court carefully avoided making a broad pronouncement of
immunity for any activity that might be approved by the state by citing Northern Securities
for the proposition that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." Id. See note
118 supra.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 352, citing Olsen and Lowenstein. Some commentators are of the opinion that
Parker dealt more with federalism than the scope of a state agency's authority. See, e.g., Smith,
Antitrust Immunity for State Action: A Functional Approach, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 263, 267
(1979).
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Penningtondoctrine, had its genesis in Eastern RailroadPresidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc.'2 In that case, forty-one trucking firms brought
an action against twenty-four railroads, charging that the railroads had mounted
an intensive publicity campaign to promote laws destructive to the trucking
industry.128 The trucking firms maintained that this activity constituted a
conspiracy to monopolize and restrain trade in the long-distance freight industry in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.129 The Supreme
Court stated that a Sherman Act cause of action could not be predicated solely
upon attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws.130 The Court
held that the Sherman Act does not prohibit people from acting together to
elicit particular legislative action that may produce a restraint or a monopoly.131
The Court found two considerations dispositive. First, a contrary holding
would permit the Sherman Act to regulate political activity as well as business
activity2 32 Second, Congress could not have meant to restrict the first amendment right of petition.
The Noerr holding was expanded in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,83
which interpreted Noerr as immunizing from antitrust liability "a concerted
effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose."'134 The resulting Noerr-Pennington doctrine renders the antitrust laws inapplicable to
conspiratorial attempts to influence public officials. This immunity exists regardless of the conduct's anticompetitive purpose'3 and regardless of whether
it is part of a larger scheme that violates the Sherman Act.36
An exception for sham appeals to government action, recognized in the
Noerr opinion itself,' 3 7 was firmly established in California Motor Transport
s
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.13
The defendants were charged with monopolizing
trade by instituting court proceedings to defeat applications by competitors for
operating rights, 3 9 and they asserted immunity under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. The Court observed that misrepresentations, although condoned in
the political arena, are not immunized when used in the judicial process. 40
The Court stated that a violation of the antitrust laws could be established if
plaintiffs could prove that defendants had, "by massive, concerted, and purpose127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

565 U.S. 127 (1961).
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.

133. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
134. Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
135. Id.

136. Id.
137. Although noting that no sham was involved in that case, the Noerr court stated
that there could be situations where "a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified." 365 U.S. at 144.
188. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).

139. Id. at 509.
140. Id. at 513.
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ful activities,' 14 1 deterred their competitors from having free and unrestricted
access to the courts. 142 Thus, California Motor Transport established that the
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies where the appeal to
a court or governmental agency is intended to harass or interfere with a competitor's business, rather than to achieve a valid judicial or quasi-judicial result.'

43

Unfortunately, the need for antitrust exemptions was not anticipated in the
original Florida antitrust act. 4 4 A 1925 amendment 5 exempted agricultural
and horticultural non-profit cooperative associations by expressly providing
that such organizations would not be deemed trusts, combinations in restraint
of trade, monopolies,146 or other prohibited combinations.'

47

Certain covenants

not to compete were exempted in 1953.148 Although the Florida legislature had
considered numerous bills that would have clarified Florida statutory antitrust
exemptions, 49 it was not until 1980 that both the house and senate could
141. Id. at 515.
142. Id.
143. These principles were applied in New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Fox, 439 U.S. 96 (1978),
when the Court noted that dealers who in good faith protested the location of a proposed
dealership and persuaded the state agency to find no good cause for permitting the proposed
dealership would be immune from Sherman Act liability by virtue of Noerr-Pennington. 439
U.S. at 110. However, a dealer who put forth a mere sham protest would be subject to antitrust liability under CaliforniaMotor Transport. 439 U.S. at 110 n.15.
144. This and other problems are discussed in Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 733-42 (1974).
145. Act of May 13, 1925, 1925 Fla. Laws, ch. 10283.
146. Id. §1 (repealed 1980).
147. Id. §2 (repealed 1980).
148. Act of May 27, 1953, 1953 Fla. Laws, ch. 28048, §§2, 3 (current version in Florida
Antitrust Act, supra note 24, §542.33).
149. See, e.g., Fla. S. 1253 (Reg. Sess. 1979, introduced by S. Dunn and others) (would
have created Florida Antitrust Act, §542.22 of which provided for exemption of agricultural
cooperatives, labor organizations, and actions permitted by the state); Fla. H.R. 360 (Reg.
Sess. 1979, introduced by Rep. Crawford and others) (would have provided for exemption of
trademark licensee-licensor noncompete arrangements); Fla. S. 710 (Reg. Sess. 1978, introduced
by S. Dunn) (would have created Florida Antitrust Act, §542.22 of which provided for exemption of labor and agricultural organizations, regulated public utilities, joint insurance
underwriting arrangements, activities of securities dealers, banks, savings and loan associations,
eleemosynary organizations, rural electric cooperatives, and other activities required or regulated by the state); Fla. H.R. 1399 (Reg. Sess. 1978, introduced by Rep. Becker and others)
(would have created Florida Antitrust Act of 1978, §542.22 of which was identical to S. 710
(1978) supra); Fla. S. 887 (Reg. Sess. 1977, introduced by S. Dunn) (would have created
Florida Antitrust Act, §542.22 of which was identical to S. 710 (1978) supra); Fla. H.R. 391
(Reg. Sess. 1977, introduced by Rep. Becker) (would have created Florida Antitrust Act of
1977, §542.22 of which was identical to S. 710 (1978) supra); Fla. S. 1244 (Reg. Sess. 1976,
introduced by S. Dunn) (would have created Florida Antitrust Act, §542.22 of which was
identical to S. 710 (1978) supra); Fla. H.R. 209 (Reg. Sess. 1976, introduced by Rep. Andrews
and others) (would have created Florida Antitrust Act of 1976, §542.22 of which provided for
exemption of labor and agricultural organizations, regulated public utilities, joint insurance
underwriting arrangements, activities of securities dealers, banks, savings and loan associations,
and eleemosynary organizations); Fla. S. 1266 (Reg. Sess. 1975, introduced by S. Dunn) (would
have created Florida Antitrust Act of 1975, §542.22 of which provided for exemption of labor
and agricultural organizations, regulated public utilities, joint insurance underwriting arrange-
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agree. 160 The Florida Antitrust Act of 1980 creates antitrust exemptions that
potentially may be construed very broadly.6 2 After discussion of the development and present status of trucking regulation, the effect of the Florida antitrust exemptions will be considered in some detail.
ANTITRUST AND FLORIDA TRUCKING DEREGULATION

The deregulation of trucking in Florida presents a unique opportunity to
examine the role of antitrust law in filling the resulting regulatory void. As the
complete deregulation of trucking in Florida removes the command of the
state from the regulatory scheme, the state action exemption is unavailable to
the Florida trucking industry. However, an even broader ground for the unavailability of the state action doctrine exists. 65 The Florida Antitrust Act of
1980 defines "person" to include "any... governmental entity, including the
State of Florida, its departments, agencies, political subdivisions and units of
government." 6 4 The Florida act, like the Sherman Act, states that "[ilt is unlawful for any person' 6- 5 to monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade. Thus,
there is a possibility that the state itself may be liable for antitrust law violations. From this it is argued that there is no state action immunity from antitrust actions brought under the Florida act. 6
Although the state action exemption no longer protects Florida truckers
from federal or Florida antitrust liability,'7 the scope of the complementary
Noerr-Pennington doctrine has not been addressed in an unregulated conments, activities of securities dealers, banks, savings and loan associations, eleemosynary corporations, and activities permitted under the Florida Fair Trade Law); Fla. H.R. 1697, as
amended (Reg. Sess. 1974, introduced by Rep. Dubbin and others) (would have created
Florida Antitrust Act of 1973, §542.21 of which would have provided for exemption of labor
and agricultural organizations, regulated utilities, and collective bargaining agreements); Fla.
H.R. 1697 (Reg. Sess. 1973, introduced by Rep. Dubbin and others) (would have created
Florida Antitrust Act of 1973, §542.21 of which provided for exemption of labor and agricultural organizations, actions regulated by the state, and collective bargaining agreements).
150. Bills that have been passed, e.g., Fla. S. 265 (Reg. Sess. 1977, introduced by
S. Thomas), Fla. H.R. 4198 (Reg. Sess. 1976, introduced by Committee on Judiciary), have
had nothing whatever to do with antitrust exemptions.
151. See note 24 and accompanying text, supra.
152. See note 25 supra.
153. Ross, Milbrath, & Litchford, The FloridaAntitrust Act of 1980-PartI, 54 .FLA.B.J.

605, 610 (1980).
154. Florida Antitrust Act, FLA STAT. §542.17(3).
155. Florida Antitrust Act, FLA. STAT. §542.19.
156. Ross, Milbrath, & Litchford, supranote 153, at 610.
157. It should be noted that anticompetitive activity which is conducted in connection
with intrastate transportation could violate both the Florida and federal antitrust laws. As
the federal antitrust laws, particularly the Sherman Act, have been broadly interpreted to
cover anticompetitive activities which have an indirect economic effect on interstate commerce
as well as those which impact solely on interstate commerce, a Florida trucker whose anticompetitive activity substantially affected interstate commerce could find himself subject to
both state and federal antitrust liability. AssOcIATED INDusrRIEs oF FLORIDA, EMPLOYERS'
HANDBOOK ON TmE NEW FLORmA ANTrrmusT LAW 24-25 (1980) [hereinafter cited as EMPLOYERS'

HANDBOOK].
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text.158 It has been suggested that Noerr-Penningtonis inapplicable to a deregulated industry. 159 However, as the doctrine is based on the right to freely
petition the government, a situation may be posited where the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should have continued validity. Suppose, for example, that a
group of truckers form an association for the purpose of attempting to persuade
the legislature to re-enact the former regulatory scheme. It can scarcely be
argued that the former scheme, with its pervasive controls over industry entry,
route selection, and rates, 60 would not be in restraint of trade within the mean0 2
61
ing of both section 1 of the Sherman Act' and its Florida counterpart. The
truckers would clearly be exempt from Sherman Act liability under the Noerr
decision itself.' 63 Furthermore, there is no reason why liability should be imposed under Florida law, in view of both the policy of freedom of petition and
the provision in the Florida act's provision exempting "any activity or conduct
... [which is] exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United
States." 64
Assuming that the truckers would be immune from antitrust liability under
Noerr-Pennington, the next issue concerns the permissible scope of their
lobbying efforts. Suppose some shippers vocally opposed the attempt to reinstitute regulation, and the trucker's association in retaliation, refused to serve
those shippers. Although the refusal to serve a class of customers would be a
65
per se violation of both the Florida and federal antitrust laws, the issue arises
whether Noerr-Pennington would exempt the truckers from liability. Most
likely, because this anticompetitive conduct was not part of the truckers'
petitioning process, it is not within the scope of protection contemplated by
Noerr-Pennington.Further, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, by protecting the
right of petition of one interest group, should not be permitted to prevent
other interest groups from likewise petitioning the government. Finally, it has
been held that the use of the courts as part of a larger plan to restrain competition does not confer Noerr-Penningtonimmunity.166

The extent of the Reed-Bulwinkle exemption presents different considerations. On the federal level, an independent commission will be established to
study collective ratemaking and the need, if any, for continued antitrust immunity. Because Reed-Bulwinkle immunity has already been partially eliminated, it is anticipated that this act will be of limited utility to the interstate
trucking industry in the future. A state antitrust exemption similar to the Reed158. The operation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is well defined in the regulated context. See text accompanying notes 127-143 supra.
159. EMPLOYERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 24.
160. See notes 60-68 and accompanying text, supra.
161. See note 94 supra.
162. Florida Antitrust Act, FLA. STAT. §542.18 provides that "[elvery contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in this state is unlawful."
163. See text accompanying notes 130-132 supra.
164. Florida Antitrust Act, FLA. STAT. §542.20.
165. EMPLOYERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 25.
166. See Woods Exploration and Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 509 F.2d
784 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975); United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360
F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973), aJJ'd without opinion, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
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Bulwinkle Act may, however, prove desirable in Florida.
Suppose a trucker's association attempted to persuade the legislature to
enact a law requiring truckers to form a rate association, ostensibly for the
purpose of achieving rate stabilization. If the contemplated rate association
required that rates be determined consensually by the member companies, such
an arrangement would be in clear violation of both the Sherman Act 167 and
the Florida act. The effect of the form6r Florida antitrust statute 6 ' on the
establishment of rate organizations has been considered by the Florida Attorney
General.169 The Attorney General concluded that an agreement among carriers
to set only one rate, or to establish a minimum rate, would violate the Sherman
Act absent state regulation.17 The preseit absence of state regulation, taken
by itself, seems to compel the conclusion that such an agreement would now be
illegal.
Another, more plausible, situation would be the formation of a non-profit
rate reporting association, which would then publish rates periodically. Although such a compilation of rates would be valuable in keeping shippers and
the general public informed of current rates, it could also induce a form of
price uniformity in that, if a price leader emerged, all other trucking firms
would have to "follow the leader" to compete effectively. One of the major
criticisms of deregulation is that, without the rate publication requirement,

shippers lack adequate information upon which to base their selection of a
carrier and truckers do not know what their competitors are charging.7' The
more relevant question, however, is whether rate publication constitutes pricefixing under Florida law. Although no Florida case addresses this question, a
Florida Attorney General opinionM7a referring to a rate organization under a

regulatory regime stated that if "individual access to the [Public Service Commission] is guaranteed, the membership agreement among participating carriers would be of no concern unless shown to unavoidably and necessarily result in uniformity of rates."' 73 By analogy this conclusion indicates that no
antitrust liability would lie without a showing of unavoidable, foreseeable rate
uniformity absent an express agreement to establish uniform rates.
Such reasoning, however, fails to take into account the doctrine of conscious parallelism. This doctrine states that a finding of conspiracy under
167. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (exchanges of
current price information, although not per se violations of the Sherman Act, will support
criminal conviction under Sherman Act if undertaken with knowledge of probable consequences and actual effect is anticompetitive); United States v. Container Corp. of America,
393 U.S. 333 (1969) (exchange of price information which has effect of reducing price competition violates §1 of Sherman Act).
168. FLA. STAT. §542.01-.13 (1979) (repealed 1980).

169. In Opinion 078-53 the Attorney General considered whether the practice of pricefixing which was encouraged by the Public Service Commission and engaged in by several
Florida motor carriers was violative of the then applicable state antitrust law. [1978] FLA.
ATr'Y GEN.

ANNUAL REP.

123.

170. Id. at 127.
171. J. Mmum,supra note 6,at 3.
172.

[1978] FLA. ATr'Y GEN.

ANNUAL RPa.

123.

173. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
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section 1 of the Sherman Act can be inferred when several firms, each aware of
the activities of the others, act in the same way. The leading case for the
proposition that an agreement can be inferred from commonality of conduct
174
is Interstate Circuit v. United States. In that case, two affiliated chains of
motion picture exhibitors attempted to weaken their competition by advising
several motion picture distributors that they would only purchase films if the
distributors accepted certain pricing constraints275 Although there was no
direct evidence that the distributors had actually agreed among themselves to
meet these demands, 1 6 the Court upheld the lower court's finding of a con7 7
spiracy among the distributors. Application of the doctrine in both Interstate
Circuit and its progeny, 78 however, has depended largely on whether other
facts indicate that the decisions of the supposed conspirators were interdependent.' 7 9 The central question thus becomes whether the participants constituted a group acting together, or whether they merely happened to be doing
80
the same thing at the same time.
Such an argument also conflicts with the 1980 Act's requirement that it "be
liberally construed to accomplish its beneficial purpose" of fostering "effective
competition."'. This tension between the policies of robust competition and
the dissemination of price information to consumers in a free market economy
is resolved by reference to neither statutory nor common law. To resolve this
tension properly, a liberal construction of the statute should be employed to
prevent this "non-agreement" to, in effect, induce price uniformity. However,
such a decision would probably injure the consuming public, the very people
the antitrust laws are designed to protect. For example, even if an entirely independent rate organization was established, there would be no practical
method of preventing price leading; indeed, the attempt itself would be contrary to the policy of robust competition.
Florida might choose to remove this uncertainty by enacting a "little ReedBulwinkle Act," which would establish an independent state-chartered rate
organization to compile and periodically publish tariffs. The regulatory character of the organization could be minimized by financing it either from the
general highway trust fund or through subscriptions to the tariffs. Although
membership in the organization could be strictly voluntary, the Act would
174. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
175. Id. at 215-17.
176. Id. at 226.
177. 1d at232.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) ("It is not
necessary to find an express agreement in order to find a conspiracy"); C-O-Two Fire Equip.
Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952) (the
"question is not whether identical prices throughout the industry in and of itself establishes
a conspiracy") (emphasis in original); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363, 369
(8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950) (mere uniformity of prices in the sale of a
standardized commodity is not in itself evidence of Sherman Act violation).
179. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REy. 655, 658 (1962).
180. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrTRusT 317 (1977).
181. Florida Antitrust Act, FLA. STAT. §542.16.
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provide Reed-Bulwinkle type immunity to members of the organization. This
provision would encourage maximum industry participation and, more importantly, would clarify the extent to which members of a rate association are
immune from antitrust liability.
CONCLUSION

The statement that the trucking industry in Florida has been completely
deregulated is true only in a limited sense. In reality, the industry will be regulated by both the market and the antitrust laws. It has been said that regulating trucking solely by means of the antitrust laws would substantially reduce
competition. 82 This assertion ignores the pro-competition purpose of the antitrust acts. 83 Further, it is of especially dubious validity in Florida because of
the inapplicability of the state action doctrine to Florida truckers. 8 4 As the
number and scope of antitrust exemptions decrease, a fortiori the strength and
scope of the antitrust laws must become greater. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized the principle that the relative pervasiveness of a regulatory scheme determines the existence of antitrust exemptions.18 5 This suggests
that the trucking industry will be regulated by a combination of regulatory
acts and the antitrust laws. To the extent that one recedes, the other will expand to fill the vacuum. Thus, as trucking regulation has receded on both the
state and federal levels, the antitrust laws have filled the void, largely by
changes to the scope of antitrust exemptions. This effect may become more
pronounced in the future if the Reed-Bulwinkle Act is repealed.
Therefore, the importance of antitrust exemptions to the Florida trucking
industry lies not in the specific exemptions themselves, but in the way they
define the reach of the antitrust laws. One need only look to the Sherman Act,
basically unchanged since its enactment 90 years ago, 88 to realize that the Act
was modified to accommodate the needs of an emerging industrial society by
the creation of the Reed-Bulwinkle, Noerr-Pennington,and other exemptions,
rather than by revision of the statute itself. Antitrust exemptions have thus
served as the "revisers" of the basic antitrust laws. Accordingly, decisions by the
Florida legislature on whether to create, for example, a "little Reed-Bulwinkie
Act," will play a critical role in determining the extent to which Florida truckers will be subject to antitrust liability for anticompetitive behavior.
This note has briefly reviewed the major federal and Florida law pertaining
to antitrust exemptions for the trucking industry. Although much of this legislation is new and untested, the Florida legislature's decision to deregulate
182.
183.

Ogborn, supranote 5, at 16.
For example, the express purpose of the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980 is "to comple-

ment the body of federal law prohibiting restraints of trade or commerce in order to foster
effective competition." Florida Antitrust Act, FLA. STAT. §542.16.
184. See text accompanying notes 153-156 supra.

185. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (rejection by
Congress of pervasive regulatory scheme for electric power industry supports rejection of
claim of antitrust exemption); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (federal regulation of milk industry not pervasive, hence, no antitrust immunity).
186. See note 96 supra.
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trucking and simultaneously enact a new antitrust law should stimulate competition in the Florida trucking industry. While problems undoubtedly will
arise, precise tailoring of the reach of exemptions to the Florida Antitrust Act
of 1980 will likely minimize the need for re-regulation while providing
efficient, low-cost service to Florida shippers.
WILmum C. NEsrrr
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